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Reflections on a Government 
Model of Correctional Oversight 
 
Richard T. Wolf, Esq. 
 
Introduction 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, corrections institutional reform 
litigation and resulting judicial oversight brought dramatic 
improvements in conditions of confinement and prisoner access 
to health and mental health care in many state prison systems 
and local jails.  Some jurisdictions relied exclusively on the 
courts for correctional oversight and failed to develop non-
judicial oversight mechanisms.  Judicial oversight required 
governors, mayors and legislatures to provide funds to meet 
mandates imposed on corrections systems by court orders and 
consent decrees.  Persistent prisoners’ attorneys and ongoing 
court involvement forced correctional systems to work to 
maintain the improvements. 
In the late 1990s however, state and local governments 
began invoking provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”) to end ongoing court involvement in correctional 
oversight.1  Decades of judicial oversight of corrections came to 
an end.  Jurisdictions that relied exclusively on litigation and 
the courts to provide oversight of the “closed world” of 
corrections suddenly found themselves without any external 
corrections oversight mechanism.  It is unclear whether the 
absence of judicial oversight will contribute to the deterioration 
of conditions in affected correctional systems, or whether it 
already has done so.  However, elected officials can be expected 
to devote limited resources to public works and maintenance 
projects that directly affect the lives of taxpaying voters (for 
example, schools, hospitals, and roads) rather than to 
 
 Richard T. Wolf, Esq., is Executive Director of the New York City 
Board of Correction.  The views expressed herein are exclusively those of the 
author, and do not reflect the views of the Board. 
1. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802, 18 
U.S.C. § 3626 (2006). 
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correctional facilities—closed, “total institutions” that 
taxpayers do not see. 
The fact that correctional facilities are “closed worlds” is 
the compelling argument for outside, independent scrutiny.  
Another is the costs: taxpayers should be able to have windows 
into the institutions costing over $65 billion each year.2  Other 
governmental institutions and operations are subject to 
oversight.  Corrections should be no exception. 
It is my view that even with the best efforts of well-
intentioned professional corrections administrators, conditions 
inside prisons and jails are at risk for erosion unless 
jurisdictions develop, implement, and support effective non-
judicial correctional oversight to fill the PLRA-inspired 
correctional oversight vacuum. 
The New York City Board of Correction (“Board” or “BOC”) 
is one model of non-judicial oversight.  Presented below is a 
description of the model, its strengths and weaknesses, and 
some thoughts about how the BOC model might inform 
jurisdictions that are seeking to establish effective oversight of 
corrections. 
 
The New York City Board of Correction 
 
A. Structure and Authority 
 
The New York City Board of Correction (the “Board”) is a 
non-judicial, government correctional oversight mechanism.  It 
is a hybrid that defies easy categorization because it is both a 
regulatory body and a monitoring and inspecting organization. 
The Board is a City agency, separate and apart from the 
City’s Department of Correction (“DOC”), the large, complex 
bureaucracy that operates the City’s jails.  The Board’s broad 
mandates are to establish minimum standards “for the care, 
custody, correction, treatment, supervision, and discipline of all 
 
2. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Crime 
and Justice Data Online, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/EandE/state_exp_totals.cfm (select 
parameters “all governments,” “corrections,” and “2005”) (last visited Mar. 15, 
2010) (compiling report showing that, in 2005, the total estimated amount of 
direct expenditures by federal, state, and local governments for corrections 
was $65,091,212). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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persons held or confined under the jurisdiction of the 
department,”3 and to evaluate the performance of the NYC 
Department of Correction.4  The Board’s present structure is 
designed to promote independent oversight though ongoing 
monitoring and inspection, but it was originally created for 
entirely different reasons. 
The Board began as a citizens’ advisory board, established 
in 1957 by then Mayor Robert Wagner at the urging of his 
Corrections Commissioner, Anna M. Kross.5  The Mayor 
appointed nine unsalaried members to be advocates for 
resources to help Commissioner Kross improve conditions of 
confinement in the City’s jails, increase prisoner programming, 
and support her management reforms.6  The original Board 
members were authorized to inspect City jails and to offer long-
range planning proposals, but the volunteer members were 
given no staff, and for many years they relied upon 
Department of Correction employees for clerical support.7  
The Board was fundamentally restructured when, in 1975, 
New York City’s voters endorsed by referendum a plan to 
reshape the Board into a stronger and more independent 
correctional oversight agency.8  New provisions of the City 
Charter changed how members were to be appointed, and gave 
the Board additional authority and powers.9 
The idea behind revising the Board’s structure was 
formally to establish and maintain an arms-length relationship 
between the Board of Correction and the Department of 
Correction.10  Instead of vesting sole appointing authority with 
the Mayor, the revised Charter provisions (which remain in 
effect today) provided that three unsalaried Board members be 
appointed by the Mayor, three by the legislature (the City 
Council), and three by the Mayor upon nomination by the 
judiciary (the Presiding Justices of the First and Second 
 
3. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626(e) (2009). 
4. Id. § 626(c)(4).   
5. N.Y. City Bd. of Corr., About BOC—History of BOC, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/boc/html/about/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 
2010). 
6. Id. 
7. See id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
3
2010] REFLECTIONS ON A GOVERNMENT MODEL 1613 
Judicial Departments).11  Appointments to six-year terms were 
to be made on a rotating basis.12  
The new Charter provisions redefined the authority of the 
BOC, converting it from an advisory board to a regulatory body 
by directing the Board to establish minimum standards.13  The 
minimum standards are binding and enforceable regulations.14 
The voters also gave the Board important monitoring and 
inspection tools.  First, the BOC was authorized to hire its own 
staff.15  Second, Board members and staff were granted 
unfettered access to all DOC facilities and records.16  Finally, 
the Board was given subpoena power and was authorized to 
conduct investigations and to hold public or private hearings on 
any matter within the jurisdiction of the DOC.17 
 
B. Compliance Monitoring and Jail Inspection: BOC’s Field 
Operations Unit 
 
The Board has a small but experienced staff.  The staff 
members track a variety of jail violence indicators, and respond 
to and investigate inmate suicides, homicides and other 
unusual incidents.  However, their primary responsibilities are 
to inspect the City’s jails, and to monitor for compliance with 
three sets of minimum standards established by the Board.  
These regulate conditions of confinement, mental health 
services, and health care.  The Board has a staff of fourteen 
employees, eight of whom comprise a full-time field operations 
unit.18 
 
11. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626(a) (2009).  See also N.Y. City Bd. of Corr., 
supra note 5. 
12. § 626(a).  See also N.Y. City Bd. of Corr., supra note 5. 
13. § 626(e).  See also N.Y. City Bd. of Corr., supra note 5. 
14. See § 1041. 
15. Id. § 626(b).  
16. Id. § 626(c)(1)-(2). 
17. Id. § 626.  See also N.Y. City Bd. of Corr., supra note 5. 
18. The Department of Correction employs 8,662 uniformed staff and 
1,611 civilians, confines more than 13,000 inmates in eight major facilities on 
Rikers Island, two off-Island “borough” jails, and two hospital prison wards. 
Its budget for fiscal year 2010 is projected to exceed $1 billion. Mayor’s 
Management Report, Preliminary Fiscal 2010, at 126-27 (Feb. 2010).  The 
Board’s total budget will be approximately $950,000.  N.Y. CITY OFFICE OF 
MGMT. AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2011 JAN. PLAN FOR BD. OF CORR. (Jan. 28, 
2010). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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The Board’s field representatives walk the jails each day, 
serving as BOC’s “eyes and ears” in the facilities.  Their job is 
to promote stable jail environments by receiving and 
addressing complaints from inmates and staff, and by helping 
to smooth the delivery of basic services.  Their goal is to 
identify small minimum-standards compliance issues and 
facility-operations problems and bring them to the jail’s 
administration for resolution before they ripen into major 
problems.  Indeed, approximately ninety-five percent are 
successfully resolved in the facility and never come to the 
attention of DOC’s central office administrators. 
Increasingly, the Board’s efforts have been directed 
towards ensuring that inmates receive timely access to medical 
and mental health care.  Providing timely access to decent 
medical services and mental health care in correctional 
settings requires close cooperation and coordination between 
correctional health providers and custody staff.  Occasionally, 
despite the best of intentions, inmates with serious medical 
problems sometimes fall between the cracks.  When they 
identify such inmates, BOC field representatives get them to 
needed care.  Then, our staff identifies systemic issues, if any, 
which contributed to the problem.  Systemic problems 
sometimes are resolved at the individual jail.  Oftentimes, 
however, they require involvement of central office 
administration. 
Both DOC and the Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene are committed to full compliance with minimum 
standards.  This is evidenced by the prompt corrective actions 
that typically are taken by jails’ uniformed and correctional 
health managers when incidents of non-compliance are 
reported by BOC field representatives.  When noncompliance 
with a section of the minimum standards is not corrected at the 
facility level, the Board brings the matter to the appropriate 
agency’s central office administrators for resolution. 
  
C. Minimum Standards 
 
The Board has promulgated three sets of minimum 
standards. 
 
5
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1. Conditions of Confinement 
 
The original Minimum Standards for New York City 
Correctional Facilities (promulgated in 1978) included 
provisions calling for non-discriminatory treatment of inmates, 
and regulated inmate access to courts, religious services, visits, 
recreation, access to the outside world (telephones, mail, 
publications, and packages), and overcrowding.19  The 
standards remained substantially unchanged until 1985, when 
the BOC amended provisions regulating overcrowding.20 
In November, 1983, the City’s inability to comply with 
orders of the Federal District Court had led to the release of 
613 inmates.21  The outraged responses of the media and 
politicians caused the City to embark on a major building plan 
to add bed capacity.22  However, new beds could not be opened 
quickly enough to meet the steady influx of pre-trial detainees, 
and another release was feared.  Recognizing the public safety 
risks presented by another release, the Board decided to 
increase the allowable capacities of dormitory housing units by 
twenty-five percent.23  However, mindful of the risks to 
institutional safety and security of allowing DOC to house more 
detainees in dormitories, the Board imposed dormitory capacity 
limits, required sound-separated dayrooms, and incorporated 
into the amended standard the City’s Building Code 
requirements for ratios of operable toilets, showers and sinks to 
inmates in jail dormitories.24 
 
 
19. See N.Y. City Bd. of Corr., Rules—Minimum Standards, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/boc/html/rules/minimum_standards.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
20. Id. 
21. See id. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. 
24. At the conclusion of a lengthy review and deliberative process, the 
Board passed numerous amendments to the Minimum Standards.  It 
considered, but declined to modify, Standards provisions governing square 
footage per inmate in dormitories and dormitory capacities.  The Board left 
intact the requirement that inmates be offered an opportunity to take outdoor 
exercise daily.  See N.Y. City Rules, tit. 40, ch. 1, § 1-06 (2009), available at 
http://24.97.137.100/nyc/rcny/entered.htm.  Also, the revised Standards 
continue to require that DOC operate a visiting program five days per week.  
Id. § 1-09.  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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2. Mental Health Minimum Standards 
 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the BOC issued 
comprehensive investigative reports of individual inmate 
suicides.  New York State’s “deinstitutionalization” policies 
emptied the state’s large mental hospitals.  Increasingly, 
detainees with mental illness entered the City’s jails.  The 
Board held public hearings in the early 1980s to explore the 
quality and availability of mental health services provided to 
inmates, and concluded that mental health minimum 
standards were needed.  The Board worked with the 
Departments of Health, Mental Health, Correction, the Mayor’s 
Office, and contract service providers to develop consensus 
standards, drawing upon recommendations from local mental 
health professionals and national professional organizations.  
When the Board adopted the Mental Health Minimum 
Standards in 1985, New York City became the first local 
jurisdiction in the country to voluntarily require itself—
without being compelled to do so by the courts—to provide 
appropriate levels of quality mental health staffing and other 
resources.  The results were immediate and significant.  In 
1986, the first full year of Standards implementation, there 
were three suicides—down from eleven the preceding year. 
Key provisions of the mental health standards include 
mental health screening for all incoming inmates within 24 
hours of arrival in DOC custody, training of correctional and 
medical staff in recognizing signs and symptoms of mental and 
emotional disorders, special mental health observation housing 
areas for those inmates in need of close supervision, 24-hour 
access to mental health services personnel for emergency 
psychiatric care, and an inmate observation aide program that 
employs carefully-selected, trained inmates to help uniformed 
staff monitor those inmates identified as potential suicide 
risks. 
 
3. Health Care Minimum Standards 
 
Using the same inter-agency collaborative approach that 
led to the creation of the Mental Health standards, the Board 
drew upon the expertise of health professionals from City 
agencies and the contract health services provider to develop 
7
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comprehensive Health Care Minimum Standards (1991).  
These require that the quality of medical services for inmates 
must be consistent with “legal requirements, accepted 
professional standards and sound professional judgment and 
practice.”25  The Health Care Standards require that an 
inmate’s medical intake screening must occur within 24 hours 
of entering DOC custody, and weekday sick call must be 
provided within 24 hours of request.26  Timely access to follow-
up care and specialty clinics on Rikers Island and at off-Island 
hospitals must be provided.27  Other sections regulate 
pharmaceutical services, dental, vision and eye care, pregnancy 
and child care, and diagnostic services.28  The Standards also 
contain provisions addressing medical records, privacy and 
confidentiality, the right to refuse treatment, and quality 
assurance.29 
 
D. Observations 
 
The Board’s roles as regulatory body, inspector and 
performance evaluator create unusual opportunities and 
challenges.  Presented below are some observations about non-
judicial oversight of local jails that have been extrapolated from 
New York City’s experience with the Board of Correction. 
 
1. Local Jail Standards can Address Challenges Unique to 
the Local Jail 
 
The local minimum standards established by the Board of 
Correction (discussed above) regulate conditions in the City’s 
jails only.  The standards do not affect jails in the fifty-seven 
counties outside of New York City.  A state agency, the New 
York State Commission of Correction, has established 
standards for the New York State prisons, and separate 
standards for all county jails.30  Thus, New York City is 
 
25. Id. § 3-01(a)(1).    
26. Id. §§ 2-02(b)(1), 2-03(b)(1). 
27. Id. § 2-04(c)(5). 
28. See id. §§ 3-02, 3-05, 3-06. 
29. See id. §§ 3-06 to 3-09. 
30. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 (2009). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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regulated by two separate sets of standards. 
Fundamental and important differences distinguish New 
York City’s jails from those in the non-City counties.  The most 
obvious is size.  Currently, New York City’s open and available 
bed capacity is 14,326 beds, and the Department of Correction 
confines 13,377 inmates.31  By contrast, many of the non-City 
counties are rural areas that are sparsely populated, and most 
of the jails have very small capacities.  Excluding the seven 
largest non-City counties, the other 50 non-City counties have 
a combined total of 9,774 beds—an average jail capacity of 195 
beds per county.32 
Provisions in the State standards typically are less 
stringent than those set by the Board for New York City.  This 
is to be expected: after all, the State standards apply to all 
counties in New York State, including many small jails with 
limited resources.  For example, the New York State standards 
do not require jails to minimize inmates’ visitors waiting time, 
or to provide visitors with access to bathrooms and drinking 
water, or to a sheltered waiting area,33 which are all required 
by the Board’s Minimum Standards for New York City.34  
There are important differences between outdoor exercise 
provisions as well.  The State standards lack the City 
requirement that outdoor recreation areas must provide for 
direct access to sunlight and air.35  The State standards require 
that an outdoor exercise area must contain at least 1500 
square feet,36 an area that would be much too small to 
accommodate many Rikers Island jail populations, two of which 
exceed 2,000 inmates. 
Regulations governing small county jails sometimes are 
 
31. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CUSTODY MGMT., CORR. DEP’T CITY OF NEW 
YORK, 5:00 A.M. CENSUS REPORT (Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with PACE LAW 
REVIEW).   
32. New York State Comm’n of Corr., Information as Provided by 
Facilities via Jails Daily Population Reporting System (Sept. 29, 2009) (on 
file with PACE LAW REVIEW).  According to the Commission of Correction, the 
seven largest non-City county jails are Albany, Erie, Monroe, Nassau, 
Onondaga, Suffolk and Westchester, with a combined capacity of 10,299 beds.  
Id. 
33. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7008. 
34. See N.Y. City Rules, tit. 40, ch. 1, § 1-09(b)(3)-(4). 
35. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7028.4; N.Y. City Rules, tit. 
40, ch. 1, § 1-06(b). 
36. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7028.4.   
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inapplicable to the unique management challenges presented 
by the second largest municipal detention system in the 
country.  Delivery of correspondence—including legal 
correspondence—presents a good example.  Male inmates on 
Rikers Island frequently are transferred among seven large, 
separate jail commands, and this increases the challenge of 
providing timely mail delivery.  Timely delivery is a 
substantially greater management challenge for the City’s 
large system than it is for a small local jail, which may have 
fewer than 200 beds.  To ensure timely mail delivery, the City’s 
local Minimum Standards require delivery within 48 hours.37  
Presumably a schedule would not be needed to ensure timely 
delivery in a 200-bed system, so state regulations do not 
establish a schedule.38 
 
2. Sometimes Local Oversight is Best Able to Address the 
Needs of the Local Jail 
 
The interests of local jurisdictions may conflict with those 
of the state.  When this occurs, local jails can benefit from local 
oversight.  An important example involved the prolonged 
confinement of “state ready” prisoners in New York City jails.  
“State ready” prisoners are prisoners who have been sentenced 
to serve time in state prison, but who remain in local jails 
pending transfer to a state facility.  During a sustained period 
of severe overcrowding in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
New York State Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) 
slowed dramatically its acceptance of newly-sentenced 
prisoners.  Because its prisons were severely overcrowded, 
DOCS allowed state-readies to languish in local jails.  
Frustrated city jail officials were unable to demand publicly 
that the State take custody of its prisoners, because corrections 
overcrowding was but one of many City-State issues that were 
in play at the time.  The City’s daily inmate census continued 
to grow rapidly.  To accommodate the ever-increasing 
population, the City converted two homeless shelters and two 
ferries into make-shift jails.  It entered into a contract with the 
State to house almost 1,500 sentenced misdemeanants in two 
 
37. N.Y. City Rules, tit. 40, ch. 1, § 1-11(d)(1). 
38. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7004. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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State facilities hundreds of miles north of New York City, near 
the Canadian border.  In May, 1991, the daily inmate census 
reached an all-time high of 22,630. 
The Board of Correction exercised its role as advocate for 
the City’s jail system when, month after month, it reported 
publicly on increasing jail violence and attributed the increase 
to overcrowding tied to the state-readies backlog.  The Board 
also cited the cost to the City of housing “overdue” state-ready 
inmates, an expense that exceeded $1 million per week for 
many months. 
The Board advocated for the local jail system.  Had jail 
oversight instead been performed by a state-wide entity, there 
would have been no one arguing that the state’s failure to take 
timely custody was harming the correction officers, inmates, 
and taxpayers in New York City.  Instead, the Board’s 
persistence in drawing public attention to the issue resulted in 
a swifter resolution. 
 
3. A Structure Designed to Promote Independent 
Oversight Entity is Very Important 
 
The Board was in a position to speak out and focus public 
attention on the state-ready problem because of its structure.  
As noted above, the nine members are nominated by three 
different authorities. 
For complex political reasons, the Mayor’s corrections 
commissioner could not comment publicly on the State’s failure 
to take custody of prisoners that rightfully should have been in 
state custody.  The Board was not similarly constrained, as its 
unsalaried members were not required to take direction from 
the Mayor.  The members’ independence allowed them to focus 
squarely on the corrections overcrowding problem, without 
having to weigh their importance against the other issues then 
being negotiated between the City and the State. 
 
4. A Daily On-Site Presence Facilitates Effective 
Inspections and Compliance Monitoring 
 
The Board of Correction’s approach to oversight centers on 
ongoing compliance monitoring and facility inspection by 
experienced, well-trained field representatives.  The daily 
11
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presence of field representatives enables them to observe jail 
operations without creating disruption among inmates or staff.  
By seeking to resolve problems at the lowest level within the 
institution, field representatives encourage line staff and 
inmates alike that their complaints will be addressed discreetly 
and objectively.  Daily inspections and compliance monitoring 
provide correctional oversight that is constructive because they 
allow for the early identification of issues requiring resolution.  
Early identification reduces the likelihood that small problems 
will fester and become major ones. 
 
5. A Local Oversight’s Understanding of Local Jail 
Conditions Yields Solutions Tailored to Local Needs 
 
An important benefit of a local oversight’s daily presence in 
a local jail is the knowledge that the local oversight acquires 
regarding conditions peculiar to the local jail.  This knowledge 
can be applied to the local jail’s unique problems to fashion jail-
specific solutions.  An example: shortly after the Department of 
Correction moved its central punitive segregation area to a 
newer jail on Rikers Island, Board staff reported a significant 
increase in stabbing and slashing incidents, and noted that 
most incidents were occurring in two areas, the recreation yard 
and the law library.  The Board urged DOC administrators to 
adopt new procedures to address the increased violence.  First, 
the Board recommended that DOC subdivide the punitive 
segregation yard to reduce the number of inmates who took 
recreation in the same place at the same time.  The Board 
argued that this approach would provide staff with greater 
control and improve inmate safety, and cited the successful 
implementation of subdivided outdoor recreation areas in a 
New York State prison.  Second, the Board suggested that DOC 
consider providing legal research opportunities to punitive 
segregation inmates in their cells, rather than in the library.  
Inmate interviews established that large numbers of inmates 
were afraid to go to the law library and were unable to engage 
in legal research.  We urged that DOC experiment with a fully 
auditable cell system, whereby inmates could call the legal 
coordinator in the law library, discuss a legal issue, and obtain 
copies of research materials for use in the cell.  We insisted 
that the alternative system provide legal research 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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opportunities as promptly as would a visit to the law library.  
Both BOC recommendations were implemented. 
 
6. The “Golden Key” of Unfettered Access is Indispensable 
to Effective Monitoring 
 
When Federal District Court Judge Morris Lasker would 
visit New York City jails during the longstanding Benjamin39 
class-action litigation, he would be taken through freshly-
painted corridors to inspect dormitories selected by the 
Department of Correction.  Employees were known to plant 
flowers in front of the jails he was inspecting.  Inmates 
reported that they were urged to remain silent during the 
Judge’s tours. 
Any oversight organization that must make appointments 
in advance to inspect correctional facilities operates at a severe 
disadvantage.  Inspectors cannot be confident that the 
conditions they observe accurately reflect the conditions that 
prevail in the facility.  Furthermore, unless they are able to 
speak in confidence with prisoners and with staff, inspectors 
are unlikely to be told about problems in the institution.  
Oversight by appointment is not without benefit, but it lacks 
the potential to identify incipient problems.  This in turn limits 
the organization’s value to the correctional system for which it 
provides oversight.   
 
7. A Non-Judicial Oversight Entity Must be Assured of 
Ongoing, Adequate Funding 
 
Structure alone cannot assure an oversight’s independence 
or viability.  The oversight organization must be adequately 
resourced.  If, as is the case with the Board of Correction, the 
oversight entity provides a regular, daily presence throughout 
a correctional system, the oversight must employ enough staff 
to do so. 
Unfortunately the Board’s revised City Charter provisions 
do not include a requirement that assures adequate funding.  
Funding has been the Board’s Achilles heel. 
 
39. See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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The Charter notes only that the Board may appoint 
“professional, clerical, and support personnel within 
appropriations.”40  The practical effect of this language is to 
vest with the Mayor considerably more control over the Board 
than the other nominating authorities, because the Mayor 
dominates the budget process.  This never was more apparent 
than in 1994 when former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, angered by 
a Board member’s comments that were critical of the 
Corrections Commissioner, attempted to eliminate the Board 
by eliminating its budget.41  By declaring his intention to no 
longer provide funding for the Board’s staff, the Mayor 
challenged the Board’s independence. 
Ultimately, Mayor Giuliani’s attempt to “zero-out” the 
Board from the City budget failed, because the City Council 
refused to accede to the Mayor’s plan.  The Council must 
approve the City budget, and it was able to negotiate 
restoration of some of the Board’s funding.  However, the 
Mayor’s efforts were not entirely unsuccessful.  The budget 
compromise that was reached resulted in a fifty percent 
reduction in the Board’s staff. 
The extent to which the Board’s budget drama chilled its 
ability to accurately and fully report on jail conditions and the 
Department of Correction’s compliance with minimum 
standards is unclear.  But there certainly has been a lasting 
effect.  The smaller Board Field Operations Unit is unable to 
investigate inmate and staff complaints as promptly as before, 
which presents the danger that “fixable” problems may go 
unattended and become more acute.  Budget cuts also resulted 
in the loss of most of the Board’s support staff.  This has 
limited the Board’s ability to issue timely reports on 
monitoring activities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Independent non-judicial correctional oversight promotes 
safe, secure, and humane correctional environments for staff 
and inmates.  The Board’s structure is designed to maintain 
 
40. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 626(b) (2009). 
41. Steven Lee Myers, Giuliani Weighs Sharp Cutbacks, Including a 
New Severance Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at A1. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/15
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independent oversight, and its daily field staff presence 
promotes effective inspections and compliance monitoring. 
The New York City Board of Correction’s local jail 
oversight model may be useful to jurisdictions that are 
establishing new non-judicial correctional oversight 
mechanisms, or modifying existing ones.  Local and state-wide 
correctional oversight organizations could benefit by 
incorporating elements of the model into their structures and 
operations. 
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